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During the last decade international aid ﬂows diminished while Africa’s relative share of
global foreign direct investment (FDI) declined. This went together with lacklustre growth
and low human development levels. In 2005, the G8 countries announced that they would
increase aid to Africa by some $25 billion per annum. The pledge for increasing aid seems to
have triggered an extensive debate about the role of aid and other international capital ﬂows
in the development of poorer countries. This study contributes to this debate. Speciﬁcally
it addresses the role of foreign direct investment and aid to growth and human development.
Panel estimations are used to determine the relationships between aid, FDI and growth in the
Southern Africa region from 1990 to 2005. Negative relationships are found between FDI and
growth while aid and growth turned out to be unrelated.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The debate regarding the contribution of aid to development and growth in Africa is highly emo-
tive with many opposing views and diverging empirical results. Extending the debate to cover
foreign direct investment raises more questions as to the eﬀectiveness of the two funding methods
to development and economic growth.
Currently, there exist divergent views about aid to developing countries. Certain political groups
tend to support substantial increases in aid to developing countries as indicated by the excerpts from
the Chair’s summary of the G8, Gleneagles Summit (G8 2005). This support is echoed by others
(Sachs et al. (2004) who call for substantial increases in aid to pull Africa out of its poverty trap.
The poverty trap implies that most African countries are simply too poor to ﬁnance or initiate their
own development (Teunissen and Akkerman 2006).
In contrast to this view, an alternative hypothesis has been put forth, which calls for investment
rather than aid. According to this view, investment will lead to sustainable long-term development in
Africa (Kosack and Tobin 2006). Apart from the fact that the new hypothesis emphasizes investment
as opposed to aid, which appears to be gaining ground, it would appear that the aid campaign is
encountering more criticism such that policy makers are moving away from aid as was originally
outlined in 2005.
The relevance of this debate–aid versus investment–is critical for Southern African countries
development as the region represents one of the most impoverished and least-developed regions in
the world1
∗North West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa. Email: henri.bezuidenhout@nwu.ac.za
1The Worldfactbook lists eight of the 20 Southern African countries as among the top 20 poorest of the world and
the 12 among the top 40 (CIA 2008).
1According to the NEPAD initiative, Africa requires about $64 billion annually in capital to be able
to generate a growth rate of 7% per annum which is required to achieve the Millennium Development
Goals (Asiedu 2004; UNCTAD 2005). Thus far, Africa has failed to attract and sustain suﬃcient
fund ﬂows. Undoubtedly, this is due to the fact that the continent is a high-risk environment for
private capital, owing to various institutional and geographical features (Naudé and Krugell 2007;
Asiedu 2006).
In view of declining international aid ﬂows and Africa’s failure to attract suﬃcient amounts of
investment, there is also an urgent concern regarding the way in alleviating poverty and creating
a climate of long-term sustainable development on the African continent. This paper establishes a
framework for assessing the role of FDI and aid in the development of the Southern African region.
The paper is organized as follows: “A Literature Review” gives a brief overview of the recent
literature. This is followed in “Regional FDI and Aid Overview” by a regional overview of current
aid and FDI ﬂows and poverty indicators in Southern Africa. Empirical analysis is provided in
“Empirical Analysis”. The last section concludes.
2 A Literature Review
Kosack and Tobin (2006) contend that due to an increasing international focus on FDI and a
decline in aid levels, it is important to distinguish the role that aid and FDI plays in growth and
in development. It is also important to distinguish the type of aid and FDI in the speciﬁcr o l e .I n
addition, it has also been argued that any study that focuses on aid should also take cognisance of
the distinction between growth and development.
According to Kosack and Tobin (2006), growth and development are commonly used interchange-
ably in most economic studies although they do represent completely diﬀerent concepts. Growth is
deﬁned by level, and it increases in GDP and GDP per capita whereas development implies more
than that. It reﬂects changes in wealth distribution, quality of life, living and wage standards, levels
of social and human development. This distinction is supported by Sen (1999). He too believes
that an understanding of development should go beyond wealth accumulation and income-related
variables such as GDP. He is in favor of using the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
concept of human development2
Ranis et al. (2000) explored the linkages between growth and development and discovered that
both are intrinsically linked. Growth leads to increases in household and government incomes that
can in turn lead to development spending by both. This then leads to an improvement in human
development. An increase in human development leads to better workforce capacity that directly
impacts organization and adaptability of production as well as the complexity of economic output.
The next phase of this review is to point out the distinction between the two types of funds: aid
and FDI.
3A i d
Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) is a common denominator for Aid. ODA includes all trans-
actions (as deﬁned in OECD-DAC Statistical Directives) that are administered with the promotion
of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objectives, and trans-
actions that are concessional in character and convey a grant element of at least 25%. Grants refer
to ODA consisting of transfers made in cash, goods or services for which no repayment is required
(OECD 2007).
Aid can be viewed as an external source of government revenue that can contribute to growth
if government policies are focussed on human development rather than on government consumption
2The UNDP (2008) established the Human Development Reports in 1990 with the aim to provide an expanded
picture of economic growth that, apart from income, also includes measures of human capital and living standards.
2(Kosack and Tobin 2006). Aid can also be used to compensate for a fall in exports, or to augment
international reserves. There is also the possibility that aid can ﬂow out of the country through
capital ﬂight (Aiyar and Ruthbah 2008).
Djankov et al. (2006) have argued that the empirical evidence regarding the eﬀectiveness of aid
is discouraging. They conclude that aid can increase either government investment or government
consumption with diﬀerent eﬀects on growth. Government investment will lead to more growth
while government consumption will have an adverse eﬀect on growth. This conclusion is based on
the proposition that aid leads to increases in consumption through rent-seeking activities with little
if any increases in investment.
The link between the eﬀectiveness of aid through investment as opposed to consumption is
discussed by Djankov et al. (2006). The authors contend that a very low ratio of grants to loans
is conducive to economic growth, whereas a higher ratio retards growth. Thus, loans with strict
repayment schedules can act as a mechanism to ensure investment rather than consumption. When
aid leads to higher government consumption, it eﬀectively leaves the country with a negative balance
of payments performance without aﬀecting growth and development (Djankov et al. 2006).
Large aid ﬂows can undermine incentives for governments’ accountability and entrench bureau-
cracy (Easterly 2007). In many cases, a sudden inﬂow of aid is seen as a large windfall of resources
that triggers corruption, rent-seeking activities and civil wars. Punitive conditions on the dispersion
and use of aid seem to be ineﬀective due to the absence of punitive measures (Djankov et al. 2006;
Kosack and Tobin 2006; Maren 1997).
Tornell and Lane (1999) and Svensson (2000) add to the debate of rent seeking and bureaucracy
by stating that in many developing nations, aid merely supports powerful individuals or groups of
individuals trying to appropriate as much of this windfall for themselves and excluding as many
others as possible. The overall eﬀect is that aid very seldom reaches its target. This rent seeking
behaviour is said to be unchecked due to the general policy of the United Nations and donor countries
not to interfere in domestic policies of recipient countries.
Whether aid promotes growth or merely lines the pockets of rulers is an issue that needs to
be explored further. Easterly (2003) and Rajan and Subramanian (2007) have been very critical
in their assessment of the relation between aid and growth. They arrived at the conclusion that
there is no empirical support for the hypothesis that aid favours economic development. Easterly’s
(2003) statement that, “Aid buys growth,” is a slogan often used in the funding of bureaucracies
that disburse aid without any real focus on what happens after disbursement.
In a subsequent paper, Easterly (2007) provided evidence against the eﬀectiveness of aid in
achieving economic development. He reports that, for over 20 years, the World Bank has been
proclaiming that aid will be eﬀective in Africa when conducted within a good policy framework. A
total of $568 billion of aid in real terms ﬂowed into Africa over the last 42 years with almost a zero
impact on real per capita GDP growth. This is in contrast to the rapid growth that has occurred
in countries receiving relatively little aid as a percent of GDP like China, Vietnam and India.
The eﬀectiveness of aid has been analysed by Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008) by distinguishing between
aid absorption (deﬁned as a reduction in the current account balance) and actual aid. The diﬀerence
between aid and aid absorption leads to an increase in capital outﬂows or reserve accumulation.
Their study shows that short-term absorption is very low, and that the increase in government ﬁscal
expenditures is signiﬁcantly greater than actual absorption. In turn, this implies that aid leads to an
injection of liquidity in recipient economies. Similarly, Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) summarize
the eﬀectiveness of aid by linking aid to growth through a long chain of macroeconomic factors that
are open to substantial noise and endogeneity.
The eﬀectiveness of aid is also examined by Djankov et al. (2006).The study highlights the large
proliferation of donors and donor organizations which they regard as an element in explaining the
ineﬀectiveness of aid ﬂows. Fragmentation of aid ﬂows by donors inhibits the measuring and appli-
cation of compliance and outcome performance. Eﬀectiveness would improve through more donor
coordination of country strategies and recipient country’s aid implementation strategy (Bourguignon
3and Sundberg 2007).
The debate on whether aid leads to growth and development is far from resolved although most
current research indicates a deﬁnite pattern conﬁrming its ineﬀectiveness. Growth is usually the
result of a good policy framework and good institutions. Thus, if aid were to contribute to growth
it will be within a good policy and good institutional framework (Alvi et al. 2008).
4 Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment is the other component of international fund ﬂows. Whereas grants are
that part of ODA that consists of transfers made in cash, goods or services for which no repayment
are required, FDI is “An investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside
of the country of the investor. Furthermore, in the case of FDI, the investor’s purpose is to gain an
eﬀective say in the management of the enterprise” (UNCTAD 2008a).
The contribution of FDI to economic growth is discussed by Naudé and Krugell (2003). Accord-
ing to the authors, the most signiﬁcant growth factors that are directly associated with FDI are
increases in the capital stock, organizational restructuring, technology transfers and an increase in
productivity. FDI-induced growth will follow the same link between growth and human development
as the growth eﬀect of aid established earlier. FDI can also directly improve household income and
government revenue, which in turn could follow the path of increasing human development (Ranis
et al. 2000).
There are important economic linkages between FDI and economic growth. Positive growth can
only result from eﬃciency seeking sustainable investments. That is FDI will only lead to growth if
FDI inﬂows are well managed and are used for investments that will encourage growth.
The link between FDI and growth potential is examined by Kosack and Tobin (2006).The authors
challenged the validity of the assumption that FDI has a positive eﬀect on human development in
developing countries, especially among poorer nations. They argued that the linkage between FDI,
growth and human capital stock depends on several factors: the type of policies implemented,
the absorptive capacity of the economy to utilize FDI and the commitment of the multinational
enterprise, making the investments, to invest in the development of its local employees and the
upgrading of technology (Kosack and Tobin 2006; Miyamoto 2003).
This is also the view expressed by Borenstein et al. (1998) who ﬁnd that in countries where the
quality of human capital is low or where substantial diﬀerences in technology exist, the local ﬁrms
encounter great diﬃculties in applying the technology of the MNE. In these circumstances, they
argue, the MNE is the only beneﬁciary of the FDI.
Miyamoto (2003) put forth the argument that for FDI to be successful in development, investment
promotion agencies and MNE’s should be explicitly encouraged to participate in extensive formal
education programmes, vocational training and human capital development. Djankov et al. (2006)
ﬁnd that private-to private fund ﬂows lead to substantial increases in growth, but private-to-public
ﬂows had no direct eﬀect on growth. Private-to-public ﬂows did, however, increase government
investment without aﬀecting government consumption. These ﬂows typically include FDI, FPI
(Foreign portfolio investment) and remittances.
The relation between FDI and foreign trade is analysed in a study by Bezuidenhout and Naudé
(2008). Their study shows that increased levels of trade lead to increased levels of FDI. This in turn
emphasizes the role that FDI could play in advancing growth and development through positive
growth spillover eﬀects coming from increased trade3
The relationship between aid and FDI was investigated by Selaya and Sunesen (2008). Their
study points to the fact that governments and international development agencies normally regard
FDI and aid as complementary factors.
3On the role of trade in generating growth see for instance Foster (2006); Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Sachs and
Warner (1997).
4They challenged the validity of this statement by arguing that aid may raise the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital by ﬁnancing complementary inputs such as public works, human capital and
infrastructure development or by crowding out foreign and domestic private investment. They come
to the conclusion that the combined eﬀect of these processes on economic growth is virtually zero.
Thus, the focus of aid should be towards complementing inputs that will encourage FDI inﬂows,
thereby achieving a stronger combined growth eﬀect.
In short, the exposition above conﬁrms that aid can enhance human capital and improve living
standards, provided that government policies are focused on achieving better living conditions.
FDI expands economic capacity by enhancing physical and human capital. The provision is that
favourable conditions must prevail for it to aﬀect the absorption of the positive spillover eﬀects
coming from international trade.
5 Regional FDI and Aid Overview
This section provides a brief overview of the current aid and FDI in the Southern African region
against the background of regional poverty and human development. The focus is primarily on the
grants part of ODA to evaluate the signiﬁcance of this component in view of the explicit call for
increased grants to Africa.
Table 1 provides a summary statistics on aid and FDI as well as other indicators including the
world ranking of the GDP per capita, human development indicators along with the regional ranking
to place South African indices in a global context4
In the table, total FDI inﬂows are used as a measure of new inﬂows. Total grants are used to
evaluate the call for aid as grants rather than loans.
From the table, several interesting ﬁndings emerge: for example Seychelles receives very little
aid (grants), but has the largest share of FDI per GDP ranking. Malawi and the DRC, on the other
hand, receive more aid per capita but less FDI per capita. Zimbabwe has a relatively high FDI per
GDP ranking, (this is however attributed to a severe decline in GDP and the fact that FDI is usually
diﬃcult to withdraw in a short period of time following the political and economic disruptions in
that country during recent years). Swaziland received comparatively little aid and FDI per GDP
and so on.
The inverse relation between aid and FDI suggests that aid and FDI are substitutes within the
region. Most countries that receive more aid occupy a low FDI ranking and vice versa. Intra-
regional, the FDI ranking is more or less even with no clear diﬀerence between SADC and SACU,
as the SACU countries receive the least aid5
To gain a better understanding of the regional and intra-regional aid and FDI ﬂows, the following
section provides empirical estimates of the contribution of aid and FDI to growth.
6 Empirical Analysis
To establish a signiﬁcant relation between FDI, grants, and growth in the region, a standard growth
speciﬁcation (Alfaro 2003; Asiedu 2006) is used.
Growth = log(GDP lagged)+log(control variables)+log(FDI inﬂows)+log(total grants)
(1)
4Global ranking is taken from the approximate 250 countries of World Bank global development indicators and
the 170 countries in the UNDP Human Development Reports.
5The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has the following members: Angola, Botswana, Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the Southern African Customs Union
(SACU) has the following members Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.
5In Equation (1), gross government consumption expenditure, inﬂation, and trade are used as
control variables. A common unit root process is present in this speciﬁcation and endogeneity is
a concern. Baum et al. (2007) suggest that a lagged growth variable rather than a lagged GDP
variable be used. This solves the unit root problem but not that of endogeneity. Using the change
in government consumption expenditure alleviates this problem but does not solve it.
Using a panel data for 17 Southern African countries for the period 1990—2005, the growth
equation was estimated. In the regression, analysis growth is measured as growth in GDP per
capita. The growth in GDP per capita of the previous period is used as the initial GDP ﬁgure. The
signiﬁcance of various control variables was tested including infrastructure, trade, and population
growth. The changes in gross government consumption expenditure, inﬂation, and trade are the
only control variables that were signiﬁcant. The estimations were performed using World Bank
(2008a, b) and OECD (2007) data for every year between 1990 and 2005. The results of the panel
regressions are given in Table 2
For the ﬁrst panel (panel 1), the estimation is made using GMM (Generalized Method of Mo-
ments) method with cross section weights. The coeﬃcients, although signiﬁcant, together with the
overall estimation results, indicate a poor statistical ﬁt. The introduction of political stability and
SACU dummy variables in Panel 2 improved the results somewhat.
The weak estimation results may be either due to a speciﬁcation problem or to an underlying data
problem. An investigation into the primary statistics of the data reveals large standard deviations,
weak correlations, and in some instances strong covariance. The conclusion pertaining to this is that
there is simply too much noise in the data, or a complete (unknown) set of heterogeneous eﬀects
for the diﬀerent countries, to estimate an eﬀective panel for SADC. Unfortunately advanced testing
and estimation techniques cannot solve the underlying data problems.
The positive results associated with the political stability and SACU dummy variables are inves-
tigated further in Panel 3. In this panel the regression is carried out for the ﬁve member states of
SACU plus Mauritius and the Seychelles. There is a marked improvement in the test statistics of
Panel 3. All coeﬃcients except grants are signiﬁcant although trade is omitted from the equation
due the endogeneity caused by the relationship between trade and FDI. A political stability dummy
variable is used to capture the decline in growth in South Africa prior to the 1994 elections, the
violence in Lesotho in 1998 and exceptional growth in the Seychelles in 1997 and 1998. The pro-
portional amounts of aid received and FDI inﬂows for some of the SACU countries are rather small.
This could be an important reason for the poor performance of FDI and grants in the equation.
It is important to emphasize that grants are not statistically signiﬁcant in any of the panel’s
results shown in Table 2. FDI is only signiﬁcant in Panel 3 where it shows a small negative coeﬃcient.
This can be attributed to the type of FDI that ﬂows into the region. According to UNCTAD (2005),
most FDI in the region occurs in the primary sector with only South Africa and Mauritius showing
signiﬁcant values in other sectors. Alfaro et al. (2004), for example, ﬁnd that primary sector FDI
disappoints in generating economic growth and had limited technological spillovers.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The international political community is committed to a substantial increase in aid to African
countries. Along with the calls and promises of more aid, a strong argument has been made for
increasing investment ﬂows rather than aid as this would lead to sustainable long-term development
in Africa. Declining international aid ﬂows together with Africa’s failure to attract suﬃcient amounts
of investment, are raising many urgent concerns regarding the way forward.
The call made by Sachs et al. (2004) as well as others for massive increases in aid to be given in
the form of grants rather than loans, although a worthy goal may not have the intended consequences.
The empirical results reported in this study do not show positive eﬀects of grants on growth. This
ﬁnding should be viewed in light of Easterly’s contention that constraints should be placed on the
6behaviour of governments. Aid should be channelled into activities that complement and enhance
current investments, but also provide the environment to attract further investment. Aid can also
be channelled towards improving education delivery and the development of skilled domestic labour
From the analysis, it is clear that the contribution of FDI to growth in the region appears
to be limited, and that the belief that more FDI will lead to increased growth, is not a forgone
conclusion. Current policies aimed at attracting FDI will have to be revisited in terms of selecting the
speciﬁc type of investment that is required. Economic growth targets could also include mandatory
human development constraints. Policies should be focused on attracting manufacturing Greenﬁelds
FDI with the main focus on training and technological transfer. Governments should also rethink
their national skills development policies as the migration of skilled labour inhibits the successful
absorption of FDI. The international perception of the region’s tolerance of bad governance and
political instability also needs to be addressed (Bezuidenhout 2007).
There is some indication of growth divergence in the region. This is important from a global
perspective, because stronger regional integration secures more stability and sustained long-term
economic growth prospects. From a policy point of view, it is important to note that the economies
of the region are becoming more interlinked, but these linkages are dissimilar in the two sub-regions
of SACU and the rest of SADC. This is important in the global context as Southern Africa is
increasingly becoming a regional economic entity.
The research ﬁndings suggest that SACU is likely to receive little or no aid in the future and
thus may have to focus on appropriate policies to attract FDI that will generate growth. As for
the rest of SADC, the outcome is diﬀerent in the sense that the focus should be on policy reform
and the development of eﬀective institutions. This will secure more eﬀective aid and FDI inﬂows to
generate growth.
A better understanding of human development and its impact on growth is imperative in any
future discussion on FDI, aid, and their respective roles in achieving economic growth.
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Angola  2.22  15  5.91  2  1069.48  123  5  162  15 
Botswana  0.75  18  3.60  7  4423.06  74  2  124  4 
Burundi  32.73  1  0.20  19  101.57  217  16  167  18 
Comoros  7.61  11  0.25  18  379.21  225  18  134  6 
DRC  21.74  3  0.16  20  90.77  230  20  168  19 
Kenya  5.45  13  4.06  5  440.09  192  8  148  10 
Lesotho  3.45  12  0.25  17  527.67  194  9  138  7 
Madagascar  13.63  7  1.82  12  237.56  213  14  143  9 
Malawi  23.89  2  1.39  13  144.63  220  17  164  16 
Mauritius  0.63  19  1.05  14  4522.31  87  3  65  2 
Mozambique  20.47  5  3.83  6  330.21  215  15  172  20 
Namibia  2.48  14  5.85  3  2166.11  134  6  125  5 
Rwanda  21.03  4  0.40  16  261.58  212  13  161  14 
Seychelles  1.64  16  9.64  1  7004.92  65  1  50  1 
South Africa  0.31  20  2.10  11  3562.05  93  4  121  3 
Swaziland  1.54  17  0.68  15  1400.92  139  7  141  8 
Tanzania  10.21  10  3.32  8  334.56  206  12  159  13 
Uganda  11.66  8  2.89  9  274.88  205  11  154  12 
Zambia  19.03  6  4.46  4  371.25  198  10  165  17 
























  SADC  SADC  SACU + 2 
Variables  Panel 1  Panel 2  Panel 3 
Intercept ‐ 0.387 (‐0.69)  0.867 (2.29)  2.937 (6.40) 









FDI inflows as percentage of GDP  0.136 (1.84)  0.025 (0.37) ‐ 0.165 (‐2.38) 







R‐squared  0.22  0.36  0.62 
Adjusted R‐squared  0.20  0.34  0.60 
J‐statistic  0.05  0.02  0.01 
Mean dependent variable  0.55  1.39  2.49 
S.D. dependent variable  4.91  5.34  3.51 
Sum squared residual  5108.42  4562  409.98 
Durbin‐Watson stat  2.20  2.11  1.82 
 
Unweighted Statistics 
R‐squared  0.21  0.22  0.27 
Sum squared residual  5108.42  5078.97  116.17 
Mean dependent variable  0.55  0.55  0.840 
Durbin‐Watson stat  2.20  2.47  1.43 
      
Jarque‐Bera  306.95  6.67  4.58 
Source: Own Calculations .Data are obtained from the World Bank (2008) and OECD (2007). 
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